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What’s the Risk? Fearful Individuals
Generally Overestimate Negative
Outcomes and They Dread
Outcomes of Specific Events
Kristina M. Hengen* and Georg W. Alpers*
Department of Psychology, School of Social Sciences, University of Mannheim, Mannheim, Germany
Although it is an adaptive mechanism that danger usually elicits fear, it seems that fearful
individuals overestimate the danger associated with their feared objects or situations.
Previous research has not systematically distinguished between the estimated risk
of an encounter with fear-relevant stimuli and the expected unpleasant outcomes of
such encounters. Furthermore, it is not clear if biased risk perception is specific to an
individual’s fear or generalized to all negative events. In an online-survey (N = 630) we
assessed the estimated risk to encounter fear-relevant stimuli and the expectations
of negative outcomes of such encounters. Items contained three domains (spiders,
snakes, and everyday fear triggers). In regression analyses we examined the specific
associations between fear and risk estimations. In addition, we compared subgroups
with specific fears and low fearful individuals. While an individual’s fear score was
not related to the estimated risk of an encounter with fear-specific stimuli, it was
related to an overestimation of negative outcomes in all domains. The perceived risk of
aversive outcomes was most pronounced for an individual’s specific fear. Furthermore,
an individual’s specific fear was most predictive of the estimated risk of a negative fear-
relevant outcome. Highly fearful individuals overestimate the risk of negative outcomes
of fear-relevant encounters. Specifically, they dread outcomes of encounters with
their feared object. Differentiating fear-relevant components of risk perception provides
insights into the cognitions which may motivate maladaptive avoidance behavior.
Keywords: anxiety, fear, risk, overestimation, cognitive bias
INTRODUCTION
In everyday life, we must often decide whether we accept or reject impending risk. Naturally, the
way we evaluate and process different options plays an important role in our fear response (of a car
crash, in this example).
In the literature, the close relationship between fear and information processing has long been
considered an important topic in clinical psychology (e.g., Foa and Kozak, 1986; Beck and Clark,
1997). Anxiety not only results in biased information processing implicitly, e.g., attentional bias
(Bar-Haim et al., 2007), but also in explicit biases in the evaluation of information, e.g., risk
perception (e.g., Loewenstein and Lerner, 2003; Lerner et al., 2003). For example, more fear results
in higher probability ratings of negative events, e.g., to fail in an exam (Butler and Mathews, 1987)
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and increased estimated risks related to terrorism in the wake of
September 11th, 2001 (Lerner et al., 2003). The link between fear
and heightened risk perception has informed the so called risk as
a feeling hypothesis (Loewenstein et al., 2001) that highlights the
role of emotions felt during and anticipated after the evaluation
of different options.
To continue, fear-related anticipatory responses are generally
adaptive and serve a beneficial function and reduce the risk
of harm (Rosen and Schulkin, 1998). These reactions to fear-
relevant events can also be described as a cognitive process
oriented toward the future (Paulus and Stein, 2006) as they
are typically focused on threat or the possibility of potentially
negative events (Barlow et al., 1996). Assessing the probability of
negative events that can occur in the future may therefore help to
allocate cognitive resources efficiently. In line with this, the Affect
heuristic (Finucane et al., 2000) states that affect serves as a cue for
information processing. It builds an impression by consulting a
pool of potential affective reactions to the stimulus item. This may
facilitate many judgments and decisions, especially so when they
are complex and mental resources are limited (Finucane et al.,
2000; Slovic et al., 2005).
However, when risk estimates exceed the true likelihood or
when the severity of the future event is exaggerated, this fear
process may be maladaptive (Hofmann et al., 2008). Interestingly,
many of the threats phobic individuals dread are not based on
an objective risk (Gerdes et al., 2009). What is more, phobic
individuals may have limited insight into the irrationality of their
anticipatory responses (Jones and Menzies, 2000). Even outside
of the feared situation, phobic individuals gave higher danger
expectancy ratings of being bitten by a spider, and higher ratings
for the injuries that would result from the bite.
This maladaptive risk evaluation has long been a cornerstone
of cognitive models of anxiety disorders and has been assumed as
a mediating variable between phobic fear and avoidance (McNally
and Foa, 1987; Beck and Clark, 1997). In addition, it may
imply unnecessary suffering and may block cognitive resources.
Furthermore, excessive anticipatory responding is considered to
limit extinction learning by triggering the avoidance of phobic
stimuli (Öst, 1996).
In the laboratory setting, many studies show that fearful
individuals exhibit a biased risk perception of aversive outcomes
following fear-relevant stimuli; this was coined the covariation
bias (Tomarken et al., 1989) (for a review see Wiemer and Pauli,
2016). In the first study of this kind, participants with high and
low fear of spiders or snakes overestimated the probability of an
aversive shock to co-occur with fear-relevant stimuli, although
all stimuli-outcome combinations were equally likely to occur.
More recent studies replicated this finding in socially anxious
individuals who tended to overestimate the likelihood of an
electric shock in conjunction with an angry face compared to a
happy or neutral face (de Jong et al., 1998). Similar effects were
found for fears of other animals (e.g., de Jong et al., 1995; Amin
and Lovibond, 1997; Kennedy et al., 1997), fear of contamination
(Olatunji et al., 2006), blood-injury fear (Connolly et al., 2009),
and in panic-prone individuals (Pauli et al., 2001).
These findings have been extended to the a priori expectancy
bias, i.e., exaggerated expectations of the stimulus-outcome
contingency which occur independent of an actual experience:
Fearful individuals overestimated the a priori likelihood of
an aversive outcome after a fear-relevant stimulus (e.g.,
McNally and Heatherton, 1993; Cavanagh and Davey, 2000;
van Overveld et al., 2010).
While these studies nicely demonstrate that the risk of
aversive events are often exaggerated by fearful individuals in
such experimental paradigms, it is less clear if this biased
risk perception is (a) related to the encounter of fear-relevant
stimuli or (b) related to the unpleasant outcomes such an
encounter may have. A further limitation of the covariation bias
literature is the artificial character of the design and, thus, its
questionable ecological validity. For example, the covariation of
fear-related pictures and electric shock may not be the same as
the overestimation of the likelihood of running into a vicious dog
on the street and being severely hurt by a bite.
A relatively small questionnaire study on risk estimations
of fearful individuals in a variety of domains has not found
distorted risk assessments in fearful individuals (Nesse and Klaas,
1994). Instead, all participants (patients with anxiety disorders
and non-anxious participants alike) overestimated rare risks,
underestimated risks of common events, and overestimated the
relative risks of a threat to oneself. One reason for this unexpected
finding could be that the encounter of fear-relevant events was
confounded with the negative outcomes of these events in the
assessment of this study.
Indeed, one study highlighted the importance to investigate
two forms of risk estimations and not only to focus on the
covariation bias that is thought to address negative outcomes
(Aue and Hoeppli, 2012). These researchers focused on the
encounters of fear-relevant stimuli and asked spider fearful and
non-fearful individuals to rate the probability of encountering
different animals (e.g., spiders, snakes, and birds) in different
locations. Against expectations, fearful individuals compared
to non-fearful individuals did not overestimate the likelihood
of encountering any of the animals. Within the spider fearful
group, individuals overestimated the likelihood of encountering
a spider compared to the other animals. These findings give
indirect insight into the distinctiveness between risk perceptions
of encounters of fear-relevant stimuli and the negative outcomes
of such encounters. However, the study lacks risk estimations
of negative outcomes and thus is not able to draw further
conclusions on the relation between the two components of
perceived risk and their distinctiveness.
One investigation that examined the two biases together found
that encounter and outcome biases were related, that is, spider-
phobic females overestimated the risk that spiders were present
in a room and also exaggerated the probability of negative
consequences of such an encounter. Dijk and de Jong (2009)
argue that these two biases do not tap into the same cognitive
anticipatory process. In their study, they found evidence for
this assumption and showed a divergence between these biases.
According to their findings, individuals with blushing-phobia
tend to overestimate the likelihood that they blush while they
do not report excessive concern about the negative outcomes of
blushing. So far, these findings reveal an inconsistent pattern and
a gap in the research which (a) systematically investigates these
two biases together and (b) draws a clear line between these two
kinds of biased risk perceptions.
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Indeed, few studies in the covariation bias literature assessed
base rates for fear-relevant stimuli which might be seen as a
form of an encounter bias (e.g., Pauli et al., 1998; Garner et al.,
2006). None of these studies found evidence for heightened
risk estimates related to fear-relevant encounters in fearful
individuals. Instead, all individuals seem to have higher estimated
risk of such encounters. This finding might indicate that risk
estimates of negative encounters are separate to risk estimates of
negative outcomes following fear-relevant encounters.
A further consideration addresses the specificity of the
encounter of fear-relevant events and their negative outcomes. So
far, research has lacked systematical investigation into whether
biased risk perception is specific to an individual’s fear or
generalized to all negative events. To our knowledge, there are
only two studies that have tried to address this question. An
investigation with claustrophobics indicated that participants
only overestimate the risks specific to their fear, showing evidence
of a domain-specific overestimation (Öst and Csatlos, 2000).
There is also evidence for domain-specific overestimations for
the domains of fear of flying, heights, and public speaking
(Gursky and Reiss, 1987).
In summary, it has been convincingly argued that fear is
conceptually related to risk perceptions. Specifically, fearful
individuals overestimate the risk of negative events. Laboratory
studies have demonstrated convincingly that fearful individuals
tend to overestimate the occurrence of aversive outcomes in
the presence of fear-related stimuli. However, there is a lack
of research that systematically differentiates between encounters
with the fear-relevant objects or situations on the one hand,
and the negative outcomes of such encounters on the other.
Moreover, only a few studies have questioned fearful individuals
about the probability of fear-related encounters that can occur in
real life and their negative impact.
Furthermore, the specificity of these two biases for specific
fear-relevant material (see Berdica et al., 2018) warrants further
examination. Thus, the two types of biases need to be studied in a
single design with more than one fear domain.
We set out to investigate the relationship between the two
biases and to find out if overestimations of encounters and
negative outcomes of such encounters are specific to a given fear
domain, i.e., fear of spiders, snakes, or everyday fear triggers. To
this end, we developed two ecologically valid risk questionnaires
for an online-survey: One relating to potential encounters with
fear-relevant situations and another that focuses on the aversive
outcomes of such encounters. Concerning the ecological validity,
we picked three fear domains that are common in clinical
samples (see Hofmann et al., 2008). Two domains of animal
fears (fear of spiders and fear of snakes) were selected because
they were comparable in terms of their evolutionary basis and
prevalent in clinical samples. While these were, thus, similar but
distinct fear domains they were contrasted with a third domain
of fears elicited by situations typically relating to generalized
worries (see Tallis and de Silva, 1992; Cartwright-Hatton and
Wells, 1997). We recruited a large sample of participants varying
in their degree of fear to provide for a sufficient number of
high fearful and low fearful individuals on these fear domains.
We expected that domain-specific estimation of risk vary as
a function of the specific fears in each one of the related
domains. Overall, we expected higher risk ratings in more
fearful individuals.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants
Participants from various universities in German speaking
countries from different departments of Psychology were
recruited via e-mail lists. Two psychology journals advertised
the survey on their homepages and social media platforms. For
our analyses, the remaining dataset of 630 people was used
(M = 30.11, SD = 10.30, Range = 16–66, 76.7% females). For
extreme group differences, we also assessed the degree of spider
and snake fearfulness as well as the degree of worry tendencies.
According to these prior studies and recommendations (see
section below), 320 participants were classified as low in fear
of spiders and 221 as high spider fearfuls. For the fear of
snakes, 473 were classified as low in fear of snakes and
39 as high snake fearfuls. In terms of worry tendencies,
101 were classed as high worriers and 529 as low worriers.
Questionnaire scores and demographic data are presented
in Table 1.
Dropout and Case Exclusion
Initially, 1039 individuals started the online survey; however, only
659 (37% dropout) of them completed all questions. This dropout
rate is comparable to the average drop-out rates if other online-
surveys (e.g., Galesic, 2006).
To provide a high data quality, participants were asked to
provide more information on three items to help us understand
the plausibility of their responses at the end of the survey.
One question asked for the degree of accuracy of one’s answer
on a scale from 1 to 4 (“I do not agree” to “I agree”). In
addition, the other two questions asked if participants answered
the questionnaires honestly and if there were any reasons not to
use their data. We excluded all participants who did not answer
the plausibility questions and who were not debriefed due to early
termination as participants were provide with the final and more
detailed debriefing at the end of the survey. Participants were
also excluded if they either (a) rated the accuracy question with
“I rather disagree” or (b) if a participant admitted to dishonest
answers or (c) if they answered with “Yes” for any reasons not
to use their data. Therefore, we excluded 29 participants due to a
questionable data quality.
Procedure and Materials
Control Measures
Participants were granted access to the survey platform
soscisurvey via an online link. First, they were provided with
general information on the questionnaires and personal data to
be assessed. After giving informed consent, participants filled in a
questionnaire battery. They provided demographic information
and then gave information about their current symptoms of
depression with the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI-II; Beck
et al., 1996; German version: Hautzinger et al., 2006). This
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TABLE 1 | Demographics and questionnaire data.
High spider fearful Low spider fearful t/χ2 p-values
n 221 320
Age 27.28 (8.31) 32.26 (11.14) −5.95a <0.001
Sex = Female 199 (90.0%) 212 (66.3%) 42.41b <0.001
Depression (BDI) 33.23 (10.64) 29.36 (8.38) 4.53a <0.001
State anxiety (STAI-S) 42.01 (11.99) 37.88 (11.03) 4.08a <0.001
Trait anxiety (STAI-T) 44.46 (12.44) 38.72 (11.54) 5.50a <0.001
Optimism (LOT-R) 21.48 (4.65) 23.16 (4.54) −4.21a <0.001
Fear of spiders (FSQ) 44.90 (22.72) 1.39 (1.94) 28.40a <0.001
Fear of snakes (SNAQ) 9.10 (6.75) 5.30 (4.60) 7.28a <0.001
Worry tendencies (PSWQ) 50.33 (13.65) 42.65 (12.62) 6.73a <0.001
High snake fearful Low snake fearful t/χ2 p
n 39 473
Age 27.59 (8.25) 30.39 (10.03) 1.70a 0.090
Sex = Female 348 (73.6%) 34 (87.2%) 10.20b 0.006
Depression (BDI) 32.72 (12.04) 30.56 (9.34) 1.35a 0.176
State anxiety (STAI-S) 41.46 (12.97) 38.93 (11.46) 1.31a 0.190
Trait anxiety (STAI-T) 42.18 (12.43) 40.48 (12.11) 0.94a 0.401
Optimism (LOT-R) 22.62 (4.55) 22.59 (4.63) 0.03a 0.978
Fear of spiders (FSQ) 30.18 (27.57) 15.06 (23.30) 3.33a 0.002
Fear of snakes (SNAQ) 23.38 (2.85) 4.12 (2.35) 41.03a <0.001
Worry tendencies (PSWQ) 48.97 (14.22) 45.00 (13.35) 1.78a 0.076
High worry Low worry t/χ2 p-values
n 101 529
Age 27.62 (8.57) 30.59 (10.54) 3.06a 0.003
Sex = Female 140 (88.6%) 343 (72.7%) 8.82b 0.003
Depression (BDI) 42.51 (12.37) 28.94 (7.34) 12.68a <0.001
State anxiety (STAI-S) 52.36 (11.46) 37.43 (10.18) 12.20a <0.001
Trait anxiety (STAI-T) 58.40 (8.83) 38.15 (9.87) 19.21a <0.001
Optimism (LOT-R) 17.31 (3.71) 23.33 (4.14) 13.62a <0.001
Fear of spiders (FSQ) 28.58 (30.57) 15.82 (22.27) 4.00a <0.001
Fear of snakes (SNAQ) 8.41 (6.74) 6.60 (3.98) 1.59a 0.134
Worry tendencies (PSWQ) 67.63 (4.39) 42.13 (10.31) 24.24a <0.001
Means and standard deviations separately for high and low spider fearful, for high and low snake fearful participants as well as for high worriers and low worriers. n,
number of participants; BDI, Beck Depression Inventory (Hautzinger et al., 2006); STAI-S and -T, State and trait version of the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (Laux et al.,
1981); LOT-R, revision of the Life-Orientation-Test (Glaesmer et al., 2008); FSQ, Fear of Spiders Questionnaire (Rinck et al., 2002); SNAQ, Snake Questionnaire (Klorman
et al., 1974); PSWQ, Penn State Worry Questionnaire (Meyer et al., 1990); at score for group comparison. bχ2 score for gender ration comparison.
questionnaire consists of 21 items measuring different aspects of
depressive symptoms (e.g., sadness, sleep disorder, and fatigue)
on a 0–4 scale with higher values indicating more severe
symptoms of depression. State and trait anxiety were assessed
with the State-Trait-Anxiety Inventory (STAI; Spielberger et al.,
1983; German version: Laux et al., 1981). In this inventory,
state anxiety and trait anxiety were measured with 20 items
each; participants indicated scores on a 1–4 Likert-type scale
(“Not at all” to “Totally”). Optimism was assessed with the
Life orientation test (LOT-R; Scheier and Carver, 1985; German
version: Glaesmer et al., 2008) that consists of ten items rated
on a 1–4 likert-type scale (“Does not apply at all” to “Totally
applies to me”).
For all questionnaires, sum scores were curated for
each participant and averaged across the sample for the
statistical analyses.
Fear Domains
Levels of fear of spiders were assessed with the Fear of
Spider Questionnaire (FSQ; Rinck et al., 2002), which is
a 18-item questionnaire with an answer format from 0 to
6 (“Does not apply at all” to “Totally applies to me”). It
shows high reliability and validity as well as high specificity
and good sensitivity in differentiating fearful and non-fearful
individuals. According to recommendations of Rinck et al.
(2002) and previously published articles with the same cut-offs
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(e.g., Pittig et al., 2018), participants with a score of 6
or lower were classified as low spider fearful participants
and those with a score of 15 or higher as high spider
fearful participants.
We assessed the degree of snake fear with the Snake anxiety
Questionnaire (SNAQ; Miltner et al., 2005). The SNAQ is a
questionnaire that captures current symptoms of fear of snakes
with 30 dichotomous items. Following the recommendations of
prior studies with the Snake Questionnaire (SNAQ; Klorman
et al., 1974; Miltner et al., 2005), a score lower than 9 indicates
low snake fearfulness and a score higher than 20 indicates high
snake fearfulness.
Worry tendencies were measured using the Penn State
Worry Questionnaire (PSWQ; Meyer et al., 1990), which is
widely used and captures symptoms of generalized anxiety
disorder with 16 items on a 1–5 scale (“Not typical for at
all” to “Totally typical for me”). We used a cut-off of 62 or
greater to assign people to the high worrier group and a score
of 61 or lower to assign people to the low worrier group.
A cutoff of 62 for the PSWQ is a recommended used score
for maximizing the specificity and negative predictive power
in a clinical and analog samples for a diagnosis of generalized
anxiety disorders (Behar et al., 2003). Risk estimations for fear-
relevant encounters were assessed with a newly developed 23-
item questionnaire and negative outcomes of such encounters
with a 21-item questionnaire.
Finally, participants answered the three plausibility questions
and were debriefed and informed about the survey topic. In
the end, all of them had the opportunity to specify their e-mail
address to take part in a lottery as a gratification for their
participation. If they agreed, they took part in the lottery and
three of them had the chance to win a voucher for an online
shopping portal.
Risk Estimations
To disentangle the different components of risk estimation,
we developed two questionnaires. One, assessing probability
estimations of specific and general risks for encountering
an aversive event (Risk of encounter questionnaire, REQ),
and another one that addresses the expected negative
outcomes of these events (Risk of negative outcome
questionnaire, RNOQ).
For more details on item selection strategies as well as validity
and reliability analyses please refer to Supplementary Analyses
(see section “Confirmation of the Data Structures”).
Fear-Relevant Encounters
The REQ is a 21-item questionnaire that captures three different
Encounter Domain, “spider,” “snake” and “everyday fear triggers,”
respectively. The Encounter Domain “spider” and “snake” include
seven items each consisting of locations where these types of
animals may be found (e.g., forest, cellars etc.). The wording of
these items was the same except for the name of the respective
animal (spiders vs. snakes). So, for each spider-item there was
a parallel snake-item. For the worry-related events, we referred
to the content of common items of questionnaires measuring
components and the severity of Generalized Anxiety Disorders
(GAD) (e.g., Worry Domain Questionnaire; Tallis et al., 1992;
Meta-Cognition-Questionnaire; Möbius and Hoyer, 2003). We
also referred to expert opinions of five clinical psychologists and
three psychotherapists working at our department.
We created to answer scales to specify the time period the
items of the REQ refer to. One scale refers to the period in the
course of the next 12 months and the other one of the period
in the course of your life. As the probability estimations for
the two different time periods were highly correlated (Range:
0.52–0.88) per item, we built a sum score of the ratings on
the two scales referring to the two different time periods for
each item. This was in order to have an overall score for the
probability estimations of the event not depending on the time
period they referred to.
The resulting 23 items (seven for the Encounter Domain
“spider,” and eight for the domains of “snake” and “everyday
fear triggers,” respectively) were rated on a 1–7 Likert-scale
(“very unlikely” to “very likely”). This scaling was used based
on a questionnaire developed by Nesse and Klaas (1994) which
assessed the risk perceptions of patients with anxiety disorders.
Negative Outcomes of Fear-Relevant Encounters
For risk estimation of negative outcomes following fear-relevant
encounters, we developed the RNOQ with 20 items that were
assigned to four different Outcome Domains, “danger-based fear,”
“anxiety-based fear of spiders,” “anxiety-based fear of snakes,”
and “general catastrophizing,” according to the results of the
confirmatory factor analysis (see Supplementary Analyses). For
the Outcome domain “danger-based anxiety” we combined two
spider- and four snake-items, because they show high loadings on
the same factor and the whole scale showed sufficient reliability
on measures (see Supplementary Analyses). Consequently, this
scale consisted of six items, two addressing outcomes relating
to bodily harm when encountering a spider (e.g., being bitten
by a spider), and four addressing bodily harm resulting from
a snake encounter. The two Outcome Domains “anxiety-based
fear of spiders,” “anxiety-based fear of snakes” include three
items each referring to panic symptoms when a fear-relevant
object is encountered. Prior findings (Gursky and Reiss, 1987)
also confirmed a differentiation of danger-based and anxiety-
based fears when being confronted with fear-relevant events. The
last Outcome Domain, “generalized catastrophizing,” includes
eight items and assesses the risk of catastrophizing when being
confronted with everyday fear triggers.
All 20 items were again rated using 21 items on a 1–7 Likert-
scale (“very unlikely” to “very likely”) based on previous studies
(Nesse and Klaas, 1994).
Statistical Analysis
Statistical analyses were run by SPSS 24 (SPSS Inc., 2016) and
R 3.4.3 (R Core Team, 2017). We conducted correlation and
regression analyses to calculate if the degree of specific fears
has incremental predictive value over the other measures, which
are not known to strongly influence these risk estimations. We
therefore added predictors in the regression models that are
significantly related to the sum scores of the subscales of the two
risk questionnaires.
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To test for specific encounter as well as outcome biases in
high fearful individuals, we conducted separate mixed analyses
of variance. This included factors Encounter Domain for the
REQ and Outcome Domain for the RNOQ as within-factors, and
Fear/Worry as between subject factor. For between-group factors,
we built extreme groups of high and low fearful individuals
regarding the specific fear domains (spider, snake, and everyday
fear triggers). Finally, group differences regarding the fear
domain as well as the Encounter and Outcome Domains of the
two questionnaires were examined. We decided to not correct
for multiple comparisons. Even if we had done so, results would
remain the same.
In order to interpret correlations, we follow conventions of
r = 0.10 for a small, r = 0.30 for a medium and r = 0.50 for a
large effect size (Cohen, 1988).
Results
Domain- Specificity of the Risk
Estimations of Encounter Domains
To examine the factors that might be predictive for fear-relevant
encounters and their negative outcomes, we first run correlational
analyses between the Encounter and Outcome Domains and all
other measures (see Table 2). In a second step, only predictors
that showed a significant relationship to the different domains
were entered in a stepwise regression.
Spider and Snake Encounters
The relationship between the Encounter Domain “Spider” and the
degree of specific fears only revealed a significant and negative
relationship with fear of snakes, r =−0.12, p< 0.001, and with no
other measures, all rs≤ 0.05, all ps≥ 0.102. Therefore, a stepwise
regression was obsolete.
Estimations of the risk to encounter a snake were correlated
with depression, r = 0.09, p = 0.034, and optimism, r = −0.09,
p = 0.022. In an ensuing stepwise regression, only optimism
accounted for a significant amount of explained variance,
β = −0.25, t(629) = −2.29, p = 0.022; model fit: F(1,628) = 5.25,
p = 0.022, corrected R2 = 0.01.
Everyday Fear Triggers
Risk estimates to encounter everyday fear triggers were
significantly related to state, r = 0.26, p < 0.001, as well
as to trait anxiety, r = 0.29, p < 0.001. Furthermore, the
relationships between this Encounter Domain and depression,
worry tendencies and optimism proved significant, r = 0.23,
p < 0.001, r = 0.26, p < 0.001, r = −0.21, p < 0.001. In
the following stepwise regression, only trait anxiety explained
a significant amount of the variance in the data, β = 0.36,
t(629) = 7.57, p < 0.001, and showing incremental prediction
over the other measures, β≤ 0.09, t(629)≤ 1.36, p≥ 0.176; model
fit: F(1,628) = 57.37, p< 0.001, corrected R2 = 0.08.
In sum, the exploratory analyses of REQ did not confirm a
domain-specific risk overestimation of fear-relevant encounters
in fearful individuals. The final models of the regression analyses
are shown in Table 3.
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TABLE 3 | Summary of the steps of the stepwise regression analyses for the
variables predicting risk estimations of the REQ and RNOQ (N = 630).
Scales of the
REQ/RNOQ and step
Predictor R R2-Change p-value
Snake encounter
1 LOT-R 0.09 0.01 0.022
Encounter everyday
fear triggers
1 STAI-T 0.29 0.08 <0.001
Danger-based fear
1 SNAQ 0.50 0.25 <0.001
2 FSQ 0.54 0.04 <0.001
3 LOT-R 0.55 0.02 <0.001
Anxiety-based spider
fear
1 FSQ 0.84 0.71 <0.001
2 PSWQ 0.85 0.01 <0.001
3 SNAQ 0.85 0.00 0.004
Anxiety-based snake
fear
1 SNAQ 0.70 0.49 <0.001
2 PSWQ 0.70 0.01 0.001
3 FSQ 0.71 0.00 0.025
Generalized
catastrophizing
1 PSWQ 0.51 0.26 <0.001
2 LOT-R 0.56 0.05 <0.001
3 FSQ 0.57 0.02 <0.001
4 BDI-II 0.58 0.01 0.002
5 SNAQ 0.59 0.01 0.005
BDI, Beck Depression Inventory (Beck et al., 1996); STAI -T, Trait version of
the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (Laux et al., 1981); LOT-R, revision of the Life-
Orientation-Test (Glaesmer et al., 2008); FSQ, Fear of Spiders Questionnaire (Rinck
et al., 2002); SNAQ, Snake Questionnaire (Klorman et al., 1974); PSWQ, Penn
State Worry Questionnaire (Meyer et al., 1990).
Domain Specificity of the Risk
Estimations of Outcome Domains
For the risk of negative outcomes, all Outcome Domains revealed
significant relationships to all additional measures, all rs ≥ 0.11,
all ps< 0.001.
Danger-Based Fear
For the Outcome Domain “danger-based fear,” only fear of
snakes, β = 0.32, t(629) = 13.39, p < 0.001, and spiders,
β = 0.03, t(629) = 5.14, p < 0.001, as well as optimism,
β = −0.11, t(629) = −3.63, p < 0.001, were significant predictors
of the probability estimations. Fear of snakes was the most
powerful predictor which was entered first into the model:
F(3,626) = 91.33, p< 0.001, corrected R2 = 0.30.
Anxiety-Based Spider and Snake Fear
The estimations of anxiety-based fear by encountering a spider
were significantly predicted by fear of spiders as the measure with
the most predictive power, β = 0.17, t(629) = 36.41, p < 0.001,
followed by worry tendencies, β = 0.03, t(629) = 3.38, p ≤ 0.001,
and fear of snakes, β = 0.05, t(629) = 2.89, p = 0.004, and
accounted for the best model fit: F(3,626) = 539.44, p < 0.001,
corrected R2 = 0.72.
For “anxiety-based snake fear,” predictors were the same;
however, with a different order: fear of snakes, β = 0.54,
t(629) = 23.01, p < 0.001, worry tendencies, β = 0.03,
t(629) = 2.82, p = 0.005, and fear of spiders, β = 0.01,
t(629) = 2.25, p = 0.025; model fit: F(3,626) = 208.80, p < 0.001,
corrected R2 = 0.71.
Generalized Catastrophizing
The final model with the best fit for the estimations of
the Outcome Domain “generalized catastrophizing,” model fit:
F(5,624) = 65.67, p < 0.001, corrected R2 = 0.59, was the
model with the best predictor of worry tendencies, β = 0.13,
t(629) = 5.63, p < 0.001, followed by optimism, β = −0.37,
t(629) = −5.14, p < 0.001, and fear of spiders, β = 0.03,
t(629) = 3.09, p = 0.002, depression scores, β = 0.10, t(629) = 3.11,
p = 0.002, and finally fear of snakes, β = 0.11, t(629) = 2.79,
p = 0.005. Table 3 shows a summary of the explained variances
in the different models and the changes by entering incremental
predictors in each step of the regression analyses.
According to the predictive power of the separate measures,
these findings revealed that probability estimations of negative
outcomes can be best predicted by fears which are domain
specific to the outcome they referred to. This pattern indicated
a kind of domain specificity for the probability estimations
of the outcomes of fear-relevant encounters compared to the
estimations of the encounters themselves.
To illustrate, the relationships between worry tendencies
and the different scales of the RNOQ are shown in Figure 1.
Additional correlational data and figures of the relationships of
the other measures of fear domains and the RNOQ-scales are
presented in Supplementary Materials.
Extreme Group Differences in Risk
Estimations of Fear-Relevant Encounters
High Spider Fearful vs. Low Spider Fearful Individuals
A repeated measure ANOVA with Encounter Domain (spider vs.
snake vs. everyday fear triggers) as within and Fear of spiders (yes
vs. no) as between factor only revealed a significant main effect of
the Encounter Domain, F(2,1078) = 1707.98, p< 0.001, η2p = 0.76.
Fear of spiders and the interaction between the two factors did not
reach significance, all Fs ≤ 1.32, all ps ≥ 0.268, all η2ps ≤ 0.01.
High Snake Fearful vs. Low Snake Fearful Individuals
The ANOVA with the between group factor Fear of
snakes revealed the same results as the fear domain of
spiders: a significant main effect of the Encounter Domain,
F(2,1020) = 105.62, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.50, and no significant
main effect of Fear of snakes and interaction, all Fs ≤ 1.60, all
ps ≥ 0.203, all η2ps< 0.00.
All participants rated the risk of encountering spiders higher
than encountering snakes, t(540) = 57.38, p < 0.001, d = 4.94, or
encountering everyday fear triggers, t(540) = 23.15, p < 0.001,
d = 1.99, and the risk of encountering everyday fear triggers
more likely than encountering a snake, t(540) = 36.96, p< 0.001,
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FIGURE 1 | Relationships between worry tendencies (PSWQ) and risk estimates (scales of the RNOQ). The lines mark the linear trend of the relationships.
d = 3.18. This pattern was the same for high snake fearfuls and
low fearfuls, all ts ≥ 23.06, all ps< 0.001, all ds ≥ 1.98.
High vs. Low Worriers
For the extreme groups of high and low worriers, there was
a significant main effect of the Encounter Domain, F(1.97,
1242.29) = 1178.82, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.65, and a significant
interaction of the Encounter Domain and Worry, F(1.97,
1242.29) = 12.36, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.02. However, the main effect
of Worry revealed no significance, F(1,628) = 2.48, p = 0.116,
η2p = 0.00. Both groups rated the risk of encountering a spider
more likely than risk of encountering a snake, t(629) = 61.71,
p < 0.001, d = 4.92, and the risk of encountering everyday fear
triggers, t(629) = 24.16, p < 0.001, d = 1.93. They were also
more likely to perceive higher risk of encountering everyday fear
triggers than the risk of encountering a snake, t(629) = 41.32,
p< 0.001, d = 3.30.
High worriers compared to low worriers did not differ in
their risk estimates of encountering a spider, t(628) = 0.37,
p = 0.708, d = 0.03, or a snake, t(628) = 0.82, p = 0.410,
d = 0.07. The two groups only differed in their risk
estimates of encountering everyday fear triggers, t(628) = 4.50,
p < 0.001, d = 0.36. Thus, high worriers only had higher
risk estimates in their feared domain of encountering everyday
fear triggers.
In sum, anxious participants had the same perception of
the risk to encounter fear-relevant stimuli as non-anxious
ones. Iinterestingly, high worriers had an overestimation to
encounter fear-relevant events compared to low worriers.
This was especially prevalent in general and domain-
specific overestimations of the risk to encounter everyday
fear triggers.
Extreme Group Differences in Risk
Estimations of Negative Outcomes
We conducted mixed ANOVAs separately for the extreme groups
for each fear domain (spiders/snakes/worriers) as between-
subjects factor and Outcome Domain (Danger-based vs. Anxiety-
based spider fear vs. Anxiety-based snake fear vs. Generalized
catastrophizing) as within-subjects factor.
There were significant main effects of Outcome Domain for
the extreme groups of each fear domain, all Fs ≥ 288.12, all
ps< 0.001, all η2ps≥ 0.36, as well as significant main effects for the
extreme groups of each fear domain, all Fs≥ 77.88, all ps< 0.001,
all η2ps≥ 0.11, and for each of their interactions, all Fs≥ 24.54, all
ps< 0.001, all η2ps ≥ 0.05 (see Figure 2).
Overall, the risk of negative outcomes of everyday fear triggers
was higher than all other estimates of negative outcomes across
all extreme groups, all ts≥ 5.01, all ps< 0.001, all ds≥ 1.63. High
fearful individuals rated the total risk of negative outcomes by
encountering fear-relevant events as higher than their low fearful
counterparts, all ts ≥ 7.51, all ps< 0.001, all ds ≥ 2.37.
High Spider Fearful vs. Low Spider Fearful Individuals
High spider fearfuls compared to low spider fearfuls had higher
risk estimates on all scales of the RNOQ, all ts ≥ 7.28,
all ps < 0.001, all ds ≥ 0.70. Furthermore, high spider
fearful individuals overrated the risk of anxiety-based fear from
encountering a spider compared to the anxiety-based fear from
encountering a snake, t(221) = 6.76, p < 0.001, d = 0.91, and
compared to danger-based fear, t(221) = 5.06, p< 0.001, d = 0.68.
On the contrary, low spider fearfuls had lower risk estimates
of anxiety-based spider fear compared to all other scales, all
ts ≥ 8.76, all ps< 0.001, all ds ≥ 0.98.
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FIGURE 2 | Mean risk estimates of the extreme groups of each fear domain on the scales of the RNOQ. Error bars reflect the standard error of means. (A) Fear
domain of spiders. (B) Fear domain of snakes. (C) Fear domain of everyday fear-triggers.
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High Snake vs. Low Snake Fearful Individuals
High compared to low snake fearful individuals gave higher risk
estimates on all scales of the RNOQ, all ts ≥ 2.39, all ps ≤ 0.021,
all ds ≥ 0.74. For high snake fearful individuals, risk estimates
for anxiety-based fear by snakes were higher than estimates for
anxiety-based spider fear, t(38) = 6.03, p < 0.001, d = 1.96,
and higher than estimates of danger-based fear, t(38) = 2.22,
p < 0.001, d = 0.72. For individuals who were low in snake
fear, this pattern was in the opposite direction: risk estimates
of anxiety-based snake fear were lower compared to all other
estimates of negative outcomes, all ts ≥ 4.09, all ps < 0.001,
all ds ≥ 0.38.
High vs. Low Worriers
The corresponding pattern was found for high worriers and low
worriers: High worriers compared to low worriers exaggerated all
negative outcomes, all ts ≥ 2.13, all ps ≤ 0.03, all ds ≥ 0.17, with
the exception of danger-based anxiety by encountering spiders
or snakes, t(628) = 1.40, p = 0.163, d = 0.11. Especially for high
worriers, risk estimates of negative outcomes by encountering
everyday fear triggers were higher than risk estimates on all other
scales of the RNOQ, all ts ≥ 17.89, all ps < 0.001, all ds ≥ 3.58.
This pattern was almost the same for low worriers, all ts ≥ 42.91,
all ps < 0.001, all ds ≥ 3.72. However, low worriers also rated
the risk of danger-based fear higher than the anxiety-based fear
by a spider, t(528) = 5.95, p < 0.001, d = 0.52, or a snake
encounter, t(528) = 5.48, p< 0.001, d = 0.48. Thus, high worriers
showed a more specific overestimation in their feared domain
than did low worriers.
To conclude, high fearful individuals generally overestimated
risk of all negative outcomes. However, the significant interaction
revealed that this overestimation is mostly pronounced in
the feared domain.
DISCUSSION
Dangerous situations generally evoke fear, but the specific
relationship between fear and risk estimations has not been
well understood. This is the first study to systematically
differentiate risk estimates of fear-relevant encounters and the
negative outcomes of such encounters. Our findings emphasize
the idea that these concepts should be studied separately. In
highly fearful individuals, risk assessments were exaggerated
with respect to the outcomes of all negative encounters but
most pronounced in fear-relevant encounters. The results
provide further evidence that risk perception biases could
be assessed in a domain-specific manner and are specific to
an individual’s fear domain, particularly so with respect to
negative outcomes.
Previous research has primarily investigated biased risk
estimations of negative outcomes (see: Wiemer and Pauli, 2016).
We did not find any studies that systematically differentiated
whether biased risk perception is related to negative outcomes
or rather to fear-relevant encounters. There was also none that
related these two kinds of risk perception. However, our data
shows that it is worthwhile to separate these two types of risk
estimations and focus also on encounters of fear-relevant events.
In our data these two concepts are not highly correlated and show
relationships with other specific fear measures. The possibility
that poor reliability might be the reason for lower correlations
is not likely – all scales had sufficient to high reliability scores (see
Supplementary Materials).
In line with other recent findings (Aue and Hoeppli,
2012), we did not find heightened risk estimates of fear-
relevant encounters in high fearful compared to low fearful
individuals. However, Aue and Hoeppli (2012) found an
encounter bias within high spider fearfuls as they rated the
risk of encountering their fear-relevant stimuli higher than the
risk of encountering other stimuli. These conflicting findings
might be due to the different methodical approaches; the
authors used a more artificial and complex paradigm whereas
we focused more on an ecologically valid method with a
huge sample. Thus, future research should investigate biased
risk estimations in high fearful individuals within a multi-
methodical approach by combining different measures of
risk estimations.
In the few studies that exist, there are also conflicting findings.
The specificity of the risk estimates between the encounter of fear-
relevant events and their negative outcomes was also found by
Dijk and de Jong (2009), but in the opposite way: In their study,
individuals who have a strong fear of blushing overestimated the
risk of blushing. However, their ratings of the negative effects
of blushing were not different than their fearful and non-fearful
counterparts. However, blushing may be a very special fear
because it can also be considered the negative outcome of an
embarrassing social event (the encounter).
Interestingly, only high worriers rated the risk of fear-relevant
events in their fear-relevant domain more likely than low
worriers. One reason could be the wide range of situations of the
domain because a wide range of fear-relevant events were rated
rather than only the encounter of a specific stimulus. Research
should therefore take a larger variety of fears into account to
investigate types of biased risk perception in more fear domains.
For risk estimations of negative outcomes, high fearful
individuals showed a generalized risk overestimation of
all sorts of negative outcomes independently of their fear
domain. Importantly, results indicate that the relationship
between risk overestimations of negative outcomes was most
pronounced in an individual’s specific fear domain. Moreover,
risk overestimations of negative outcomes of fear-relevant
encounters could be best predicted by the specific fear domain.
These findings provide further insight into a domain-specific
risk perception of negative outcomes which extended previous
literature that only assessed either one fear domain or only uses
one fear-relevant material (e.g., Lovibond et al., 1994; Diamond
et al., 1995; de Jong et al., 1998; van Overveld et al., 2010; Duits
et al., 2016). Results of a domain-specific overestimation were
also confirmed by regression analyses; the degree of fear in the
relating domain had the most predictive power for the domains
of risk estimations of negative outcomes.
Furthermore, results show that danger and anxiety risk
estimations load on separate factors. Anxiety-based risk estimates
showed an even more domain-specific structure as it could be
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differentiated between anxiety-based risk expectancies for spiders
as well as for snakes. These findings are in line with prior
findings that indicate a danger and anxiety-based structure of risk
estimations (Gursky and Reiss, 1987). This brings to attention
the further need to investigate the particular content of risk
estimations systematically, even if there is still a lack of studies
in this area. Additional research is needed to further confirm
the data structure with clinical samples, for example participants
with specific phobias across different fear domains or generalized
anxiety disorder.
Interestingly, high spider and high snake fearful individuals
especially overestimated their risk of panicking when
encountering their specific feared animal and being harmed
by these animals. Most studies only examined the perceived
association between a fear-relevant stimulus and an aversive
outcome such as an electric shock (e.g., in the covariation bias
paradigm). The latter seems to be more similar to harm than the
experience of panic. Therefore, future research should involve an
experimental design that covers both kinds of negative outcomes,
danger-based and anxiety-based.
Our results must be interpreted with due caution. First, they
are based on an online-survey which provide less control as
could be achieved in a laboratory. However, recent research has
documented that paper-pencil and computer-based (Gwaltney
et al., 2008) or Internet-based assessments (Weigold et al., 2013)
yield equivalent self-report.
What is more, high fearful and low fearful individuals were
identified post-hoc. Thus, samples differed in sizes and other
important variables, e.g., gender, that may play as confounding
variables. We used Levene’s-test to account for the difference in
sample size which might have resulted in less statistical power
(Rusticus and Lovato, 2014). However, because our assessment
was reliable and our samples large, there was enough power to
test our hypotheses.
In addition, our sample only consisted of high and low
fearful participants and a clinical diagnoses was not assessed.
In a patient sample, risk estimations may indeed be more
pronounced. Thus, further research needs to examine different
risk perception components with a clinical sample. Furthermore,
we did not control for other mental disorders or conditions
that might have affected risk perception in our sample. Thus,
future research should control for these differences in more
standardized research designs. A further point refers to the fear
domains we chose. Our selection was based on fear domains
that are common in clinical samples (Hofmann et al., 2008)
and that are comparable in terms of their evolutionary basis
but often specifically feared in clinical samples. As a reference
category, we chose generalized worries as they contain different
daily fear triggers and could be contrasted against the animal
fears (Meta-cognitions questionnaire; Cartwright-Hatton and
Wells, 1997; Worry domains questionnaire: Tallis and de Silva,
1992). These fear domains did not build an exhaustive selection
of fear areas and participants were not asked about personal
fear-eliciting situations. Asking participants about their risk
assessments about the personally fear-relevant conditions could
result in further bias. Finally, we did not seek to examine
implicit biases in information processing. Thus, memory or
attentional biases might have caused the differences between
high and low fearfuls. Future research designs should capture
both, implicit and explicit information processing, thus allowing
conclusions about the implicit processes in high fearful and low
fearful individuals.
However, our results provide a first insight in distinguishable
components of risk estimation with a large sample and a variety
of different fears. Along with the good statistical power and the
methodical as well as theoretical foundation for the measures of
risk estimations.
Our findings are of special interest as cognitive interventions
are often derived from cognitive models. These models also
include elements of maladaptive risk evaluation. However, it
has not been clear, what specific component of risk evaluation
is actually biased in high fearful individuals. Importantly, the
anticipation of negative outcomes has been found to be one of
the main drivers of avoidance behavior in anxiety disorders (see
Bublatzky et al., 2017; Pittig et al., 2018). Even in the absence
of aversive experience, threat expectations may remain stable
(Bublatzky et al., 2014) especially if they are not adequately
addressed by therapeutic interventions. At the same time,
perceptions of threat have been shown to be accessible to social
instructions (Bublatzky et al., 2014). Therefore, cognitive models
should include components of risk estimations in further detail
and make predictions of their effect on avoidance behavior.
In addition, we have previously suggested that risk
assessments should be more systematically targeted in the
treatment of anxiety disorders (Alpers, 2010). The present
findings provide further insight into the specific cognitions,
which influence subsequent avoidance behavior; exaggerated
assessments of aversive events may be a relevant target
for therapeutic interventions. Of course, individual case
analysis is needed to identify the biased component of risk
estimations in each patient in order to adequately address the
maladaptive mechanism.
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